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I. Introduction
Agricultural land is a vital national resource that is disap-
pearing rapidly. It would be difficult to overstate the adverse im-
pact this trend has on the physical, cultural, and economic
landscape of America from the local to the national levels. Conse-
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quently, many states are attempting to protect farmland through
various measures. Suffolk County, New York, is typical of many
agriculturally productive counties on the fringe of large cities,
which have lost farmland to development at a rapid rate. Suffolk
County's response was to innovate America's first purchase of de-
velopment rights (PDR) program to protect its dwindling farm-
land. While Suffolk's PDR program has been successful, success
has come at a price that other counties may be unable or unwilling
to pay.
This comment analyzes the purchase of development rights
program employed by Suffolk County and the five Peconic Bay
towns to protect their farmland. The effects of farmland loss are
far reaching, and Part II discusses the importance of protecting
farmland in general and for Suffolk County, in particular. In ad-
dition to explaining the legal framework on the state and local
level for Suffolk County's PDR program, Part III details the sub-
stance and procedure of the program. Finally, Part IV evaluates
Suffolk County's PDR program using a variety of factors, which
critics and proponents have highlighted as characteristic of PDR
programs in general. The conclusion of this analysis of Suffolk
County's program is that PDR is an important mechanism for pro-
tecting farmland, but is best considered as a tool in a larger pres-
ervation regime.
II. Background
A. Disappearing Farmland
The abundance of food we encounter at the supermarket be-
lies the serious threat to the future of agriculture from the rapid
loss of farmland throughout the United States. According to an
American Farmland Trust study, the United States loses approxi-
mately 1.5 million acres of farmland per year to development.1
The same study revealed that New York suffers the loss of about
1. See Farming on the Fringe, DEVELOPMENTS, July 1993, at 11. The estimated
number of acres lost per year varies. A calculation of the numbers from the USDA's
1997 Census of Agriculture reveals a lower, yet still significant, national rate of loss of
about 844,000 acres per year. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., Nat'l Agric. Statistics Serv.,
Census of Agriculture Highlights of Agriculture: 1997 and 1992, http://www.nass.
usda.gov/census/census97/highlights/usasum/us.txt (last modified Jan. 28, 1999). By
contrast, another commentator estimates the loss at 4.2 million acres per year, based
on a drop from 1.1416 billion acres of farmland in 1945 to 945.5 million acres in 1992.
See Luther Tweeten, Essay, Food Scarcity and Farmland Preservation, 3 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 237, 240 (1998).
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100,000 acres per year.2 Between 1950 and 1987, the number of
farms in New York decreased 70% to 37,000, and the acreage de-
creased 47.5% to 8.5 million.3 The USDA's 1997 Census of Agri-
culture in New York indicates that these numbers have dipped
further, finding 7.25 million acres in farmland and 18,426 full-
time farms.4
Rapid urbanization is probably the greatest contributor to the
conversion of farmland to non-agricultural uses. Conventional
suburban zoning encourages a sprawling pattern of growth that
consumes land disproportionately to the growth in population.
For example, while Chicago's population has grown 4% in the last
twenty years, its metro area has expanded by 40-60%.5
The adverse effects of such land-consumptive growth on farm-
land is exacerbated by the fact that "one-third of [the nation's]
prime farmland - accounting for more than half of gross U.S. agri-
cultural sales - is located in or adjacent to metropolitan areas."6
The development pressure of an expanding metropolitan area is
intense in New York where 96% of farming takes place in proxim-
ity to cities. 7 The consequence of this pressure is evidenced by the
fact that the state's cropland and pastureland declined by 707,000
acres between 1982 and 1991.8
B. The Ripple Effect of Farmland Loss
A variety of unintended and interrelated environmental, eco-
nomic, and cultural costs accompany the loss of significant per-
centages of our farmland. Beyond issues of national food security,
which arise from a reduced capacity to produce food domestically,
potentially serious environmental threats also accompany the loss
2. See Farming on the Fringe, supra note 1, at 11; see also David L. Szlanfucht,
How to Save America's Depleting Supply of Farmland, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 333; see
also Sean F. Nolon & Cozata Solloway, Note & Comment, Preserving Our Heritage:
Tools to Cultivate Agricultural Preservation in New York State, 17 PACE L. REV. 591
(1997) [hereinafter Nolon & Solloway].
3. See Nolon & Solloway, supra note 2, at 595.
4. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., N.Y. Agric. Statistics Serv., 1997 Census of Agricul-
ture State Profile, httpJ/www.nass.usda.gov/census/census97/profiles/ny/nypst.pdf
(last modified Jan. 28, 1999).
5. See Farming on the Fringe, supra note 1, at 11.
6. Farming on the Fringe, supra note 1, at 11.
7. See KIRSTEN FERGUSON ET AL., CALL TO ACTION: FARMLAND PROTECTION SUC-
CESS STORIES IN THE EMPIRE STATE 7 (1998); see also John R. Nolon, The Stable Door is
Open: New York's Statutes to Protect Farm Land, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36 (1995) (noting
that 58% of New York's agricultural production areas are within developing areas,
and 38% of which is immediately adjacent to developing areas).
8. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 7.
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of farmland. 9 Farmland provides various beneficial environmen-
tal functions. For instance, farmland has value as wildlife
habitat, is compatible with wetlands protection, and provides
stormwater filtering.10 The effectiveness of farmland in perform-
ing these functions is demonstrated by findings that the conver-
sion of farmland to more urban uses results in a 140-180%
increase in nonpoint source pollution." As prime farmlands dis-
appear, these ecological services are lost while more marginal
lands must be brought into cultivation to meet demand.' 2 Trans-
forming those lands into productive use usually requires signifi-
cant irrigation and fertilization, activities that detrimentally
affect water supply and quality.13 Furthermore, the added cost of
these activities may make farming prohibitive for new farmers,
and many smaller farmers already struggling to survive. 14
The loss of farmland has other significant economic costs as
well.' 5 In New York, agriculture is the state's principal land use
and routinely produces about $3 billion a year in gross cash in-
come. 16 The importance of farming to Suffolk County and the
State is demonstrated by the fact that, "[b]ecause Suffolk County
has one-third of all the irrigated farmland in New York State, the
farming industry is able to sustain itself in droughts, such as the
1995 growing season.' 7 Moreover, at the local level, farms have a
mutually dependent relationship with non-farming industries, in-
cluding suppliers, marketers, and tourism.' 8 Suffolk County ben-
efits economically from agriculture, which "generates a positive
'trickle down' effect by lessening the county's tax burden and stim-
9. See Farming on the Fringe, supra note 1, at 11.
10. See Jeanne S. White, Beating Plowshares into Townhomes: The Loss of Farm-
land and Strategies for Slowing its Conversion to Nonagricultural Uses, 28 ENVTL. L.
113 (1998).
11. See John Tippet, Relating Land Use and Buffer Areas to In-stream Water
Quality: The Salt Fork Watershed in Illinois, http/www.epa.gov/OWOW/info/New-
sNotes/issue26/nps26wqm.html#Relating (last modified Nov. 3, 2000).
12. See Farming on the Fringe, supra note 1, at 11.
13. See Farming on the Fringe, supra note 1, at 11.
14. Ensuring the continued viability of farming is the ultimate goal not only of a
PDR program, but of an entire framework of law in New York State, including right to
farm laws and agricultural zoning. See generally Gregory Poe et al., The P's of Farm-
land Protection, POLICY ISSUES IN RURAL LAND USE, Dec. 1997.
15. See generally Holly Thomas, The Economic Benefits of Land Conservation,
Feb. 1991 (published by the Dutchess County Planning Department).
16. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 7; see also Nolon & Solloway, supra note
2.
17. AGRICULTURAL & FARMLAND PROTECTION PLAN, SUFFOLK COUNTY, EXECUTIVE
SUmMARY 1990 (on file with author) [hereinafter SUFFOLK PROTECTION PLAN].
18. See White, supra note 10.
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ulating sales tax and tourism."19 Suffolk County's Planning Di-
rector suggests that without farming, "Suffolk County's $2 billion
tourist industry would be seriously weakened."20 The Town of
Southampton has recognized that "[flarmland is essential to the
continued success of [its] second home and tourism industries."21
The loss of farming, therefore, would mark the loss of many of
these dependent industries.
Protecting farmland also makes a significant positive impact
on the local economy, while its loss often results in adverse im-
pacts on the long-term fiscal stability of a local government. After
studying the fiscal impact of different types of development in
over fifty eight communities, American Farmland Trust concluded
that farm, forest, and open lands cost the local community an av-
erage of $.37 per acre in community services, as opposed to $1.15
per acre for residential development. 22 In other words, farms, for-
ests, and open spaces pay more in local taxes than they cost the
local government to provide services to those properties. By con-
trast, residential development is a net drain on the local govern-
ment.23 In addition, protecting farmland in critical areas such as
flood plains can reduce the costs associated with drainage
projects. 24 The fact that communities with land preservation pro-
grams typically receive higher bond rating provides another eco-
nomic incentive for a local government to preserve farmland.25
Finally, the less tangible negative result of losing a way of life
cannot be overstated. Working farms are among the special fea-
tures of a town, and, consequently, are intimately linked to its
19. FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 12.
20. FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 12.
21. TowN OF SOUTHAMPTON, FARM AND FARMLAND PRESERVATION OPTIONS FOR
FARMLAND OwNERs (1998).
22. See Am. Farmland Trust - Farmland Info. Ctr., Cost of Community Services
Studies: Fact Sheet, http://www.farmlandinfo.org/ficdtas/tafs-cocs.html (last modified
Jan. 2000). A fiscal impact analysis of the Town of Pittsford in 1993 supports AFT's
findings. The Pittsford study concluded, in part, that a new home must be worth
$350,000 if tax rates are to remain constant after the home is built. In other words, a
home sold for less than that "break even" price will not cover in property taxes what
the town must spend to service the home. CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH,
INC., FISCAL IMPACT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES 10 (1993).
23. One commentator concluded from similar statistics that 1) farmland preserva-
tion should receive consideration when looking at the economic future of a region, and
2) the guiding principle of American land use planning, asserting that development is
the key to economic prosperity at the local level may be incorrect. See Henry E.
Rodegerdts, Land Trusts & Agricultural Conservation Easements, 13-SUM NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T 336 (1998).
24. See Szlanfucht, supra note 2, at 333 n.57.
25. See Szlanfucht, supra note 2, at 333 n.57.
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character, which residents seek to preserve. 26 The Suffolk County
Planning Commission highlighted the value of preserving farm-
land, calling it an important planning tool to "buffer against sub-
urban sprawl and maintain[ I the rural character of the area.27
This cultural loss seems especially sad when it is replaced by
sprawl development that paves over open space, draws businesses
out of the inner cities, and pushes recreational areas farther away
from urban residents. 28
Suffolk County mirrors the trend of agricultural land loss
throughout New York State and the nation. 29 Located at the East
end of Long Island and home of "the Hamptons," Suffolk County is
subjected to development pressures from urbanization as well as
from the construction of second homes. Recognizing the impor-
tance of stemming the loss of one of their most important assets,30
Suffolk County established the nation's first county purchase of
development rights program in 1974. 31
26. A proponent of the two percent transfer tax, used to fund some local PDR
programs, argues that placing the burden on the buyer is fair since the buyer is
purchasing in that location because of the character of the place. Kevin MacDonald,
Address at Katonah Community Center on Suffolk County's PDR experiences (Oct.
12, 1999) (Mr. MacDonald is vice president of The Group for the South Fork, a non-
profit organization working to protect farmland and open space). Wendell Berry is a
modern essayist who expresses the value of reconnecting with the land and promoting
a simpler way of life in the face of the fast-paced commercialism that pervades mod-
em society. See e.g. WENDELL BERRY, THE GIFT OF THE GOOD EARTH.
27. SUFFOLK COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION, SUFFOLK COUNTY FARMLAND PRES-
ERVATION PROGRAM: HISTORY AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVE 1 (1990) [hereinafter SUF-
FOLK PROGRAM HISTORY].
28. See Szlanfucht, supra note 2, at 340; see also James Howard Kunstler, Home
from Nowhere, Atl. Monthly, Sept, 1996, at 43 (discussing the negative effects of sub-
urban sprawl).
29. See SUFFOLK COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION, SUFFOLK COUNTY FARMLAND
PRESERVATION PROGRAM (1990) [hereinafter SUFFOLK PRESERVATION PROGRAM] (not-
ing a loss of 8,099 acres, or 16.2 percent, of farmland between 1985 and 1990); see
also, Farming on the Fringe, supra note 1; see also, U.S. Dep't of Agric., N.Y. Agric.
Statistics Serv., 1997 Census of Agriculture State Profile, http://www.nass.usda.gov/
census/census97/profiles/ny/nypst.pdf (last modified Jan. 28, 1999). According to a
1997 census of agriculture in New York, land in farms decreased by three percent and
the number of full time farms decreased by eight percent (a real number loss of just
over 1,500 farms) between 1992 and 1997. A similar census for the United States
reveals a loss of 13,736,251 acres of farmland between 1992 and 1997, or approxi-
mately 2,747,250 acres per year.
30. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27 (listing the benefits of the
farming industry as jobs, buffering of suburban sprawl, maintenance of rural charac-
ter and the tourism industry); see also U.S. Dep't of Agric., Econ. Research Serv., New
York Fact Sheet, http://www.ers.usda.gov/StateFacts/NY.htm (last modified Jan. 1,
2001).
31. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27.
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C. Purchasing Development Rights (PDR)
A PDR program arranges to restrict the right of an owner to
construct nonagricultural uses on his land, a right that has tradi-
tionally accompanied land ownership.32 Participation in the pro-
gram is entirely voluntary. 33 Technically, the restriction is a
negative easement in gross, 34 which is memorialized in a legal in-
strument recorded with the property deed so that it runs with the
land.35 The buyer of this lesser interest, the county or local gov-
ernment in Suffolk County's program, acquires the right and re-
sponsibility to prevent development on the land.36 The landowner
retains all other rights of ownership, including the rights to farm,
to prevent trespass, or to transfer the land.37 Compensation for
the permanent restriction of the land is valued as the difference
between the full market value of property for its highest and best
use (full value) minus the value of the agricultural rights (residual
value).38
32. See Nick Williams & Nelson Bills, Protecting Farmland: State Funded
Purchase of Development Rights (PDR) Programs in the Northeast, POLICY ISSUES IN
RURAL LAND USE (Jan. 1991).
33. Id.
34. Although the terms "development rights" and "easements" are used inter-
changeably, they are distinguishable. "Strictly speaking, development rights are neg-
ative easements in gross. A positive easement gives one party the right to use
another party's land, such as for a hiking trail. A negative easement restricts what a
landowner can do with their land. An easement also may be either appurtenant, con-
nected with the ownership of nearby land, such as a right-of-way; or in gross, which
grants the holder of the easement a claim upon the property, such as the right to
develop." Thomas L. Daniels, The Purchase of Development Rights: Preserving Agri-
cultural Land and Open Space, J. Am. PLAN. AsS'N 430 n.1 (Autumn 1991). Conserva-
tion easements are discussed in depth in Joseph Stinson & Liane Wilson, Preserving
Open Space with Land Trusts and Conservation Easements, available at http:ll
www.law.pace.edu/landuse/lndtrs.html (1996).
35. See Daniels, supra note 34; see also American Farmland Trust, PURCHASE OF
AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, FACT SHEET, Sept., 1998 [hereinafter
American Farmland Trust].
36. See American Farmland Trust, supra note 35. The PDR program is somewhat
flexible and terms may be included in the agreement to allow the construction of new
farm buildings and housing for family and employees. See American Farmland Trust,
supra note 35. Monitoring compliance is likely to slip where government agencies are
more preoccupied with acquiring the development rights. See Daniels, supra note 34.
37. See American Farmland Trust, supra note 35.
38. See also JOHN R. NOLON, WELL GROUNDED (1998); see also Michael N. Morea,
New York Statutes that Provide for the Protection of Agricultural Lands, Part III,
available at http:/www.law.pace.edu/landuse/morea.html (last modified Nov. 21,
2000); see also Rodegerdts, supra note 23.
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III. Suffolk County Farmland Preservation Program
A. The Legal Authority to Preserve Farmland Through PDR
Suffolk County's Farmland Protection Program functions
within a state statutory framework that supports and authorizes
agricultural land preservation in general, and the purchase of de-
velopment rights in particular. New York State has officially rec-
ognized the importance of farmland by making farmland
preservation an official state policy. 39 Article XIV, section four of
the New York State Constitution states that, "[tihe policy of the
state shall be to conserve and protect its natural resources and
scenic beauty and encourage the development and improvement of
its agricultural lands for the production of food and other agricul-
tural products."40 Subsequent farm bills continue to declare that
it is in the public interest for the State "to encourage the preserva-
tion of farmland" and "to prevent the forced conversion of farm-
land.., to more intensive uses as a result of economic pressure."4'
In support of this view, the State Legislature has found that farm-
land is vital "in order to maintain a readily available source of
food.., to conserve the state's natural resources and to provide for
the welfare and happiness of the inhabitants of the state."42
Suffolk County's PDR program has relied on Section 247 of
the General Municipal Law, which provides local governments
with explicit authority to acquire interests or rights in real prop-
erty to preserve farmland used in bona fide agricultural produc-
tion.43 The law specifically states that:
The acquisition of interests or rights in real property for the
preservation of open spaces and areas shall constitute a public
purpose for which public funds may be expended or advanced,
and any county, city, town or village may acquire ... the fee or
any lesser interest, development right, [or] easement ... neces-
sary to achieve the purpose of this chapter.44
39. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4.
40. Id.
41. S. Res. 1632-A, 1999 Leg., 222d Sess., Reg. Sess. § 1 (N.Y. 1999).
42. Id.
43. See N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 247 (McKinney 1999).
44. Id. § 247(2).
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The natural resources to be protected "include . . .agricultural
lands defined as open lands actually used in bona fide agricultural
production."45
Given the State's constitutional policy and its explicit grant of
authority to local governments to purchase development rights,
PDR programs are a legally sound mechanism that local govern-'
ments in New York can use to preserve farmland. A legal chal-
lenge could arise only if the PDR program was administered in a
manner that would defeat the public purpose requirement at-
tached to the expenditure of public funds. It would not be a public
purpose, for example, if the only applications approved were
friends or relatives of the Town Board.
B. An Overview of Procedure and Funding
Originally, the Suffolk County Legislature passed Local Law
19-1974, establishing the procedures to acquire development
rights in agricultural land. 46 The enactment was subsequently re-
placed in 1981, by Local Law 16, which is presently codified in
Chapter 8 of the Suffolk County Code.47 Accordingly, the county
solicits offers or accepts recommendations from a Farmland Com-
mittee for the sale of development rights on agricultural land.48
The County Executive then orders the appraisal of the market
value of the development rights. 49 The Farmland Committee re-
views the applications and decides which to recommend to the
County Legislature after public hearing.50 The County Legisla-
45. Id. § 247(1). Section 301 of the New York Agriculture and Markets Law de-
fines "[Mand used in agricultural production." N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 301(3) (Mc-
Kinney 1999).
46. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 7-8; N.Y. LocAL LAw § 19.
47. See N.Y. LocAL LAw 16-1981; SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., CODE, ch. 8 (1981).
48. See SUFFOLK CouNwY, N.Y., CODE § 8-3 (1981). This law also established the
Farmland Committee to carry out the following duties: (1) recommend available lands
to the County Legislature, (2) review requests to subdivide the remainder fee of lands,
(3) review any matters relevant to development rights and agricultural economy, (4)
serve as review board for permitting construction and farm stands, (5) and to promul-
gate rules and regulations to carry out intent of program. See id. § 8-5.
49. See Daniels, supra note 34, for a discussion of some difficulties surrounding
the appraisal of agricultural land, especially under agricultural zoning.
50. See SUFFOLK COUrNTY, N.Y., CODE § 8 (1981); N.Y. LocAL LAW 16-1981 § 4(a).
Because funds are limited, available land is prioritized using a variety of criteria.
These criteria are generally based on two major considerations: the degree of develop-
ment pressure on the land, and the likelihood that the land will continue as working
farm. See Williams & Bills, supra note 32. A list of Suffolk County's criteria is availa-
ble from the Suffolk County, N.Y. Planning Department.
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ture's decision is required within thirty days after it holds its own
public hearing.51
The Suffolk County Farmland Preservation Program has
been funded almost exclusively by municipal bonds issued for a
thirty-year period.52 The 1974-1976 Capital Program for the
county authorized $45 million to acquire the development rights
on 9,000 acres of agricultural land. 53 In 1975, a year after the
county authorized the Agricultural Program,54 382 bids were sub-
mitted totaling 17,949 acres at a cost of $6,491 per acre, or $116.5
million.5 5 Subsequently, on September 8, 1976, the County Legis-
lature authorized negotiations for Phase 1,56 which included sixty
parcels containing 3,883 acres in Riverhead, Southold, and South-
ampton. 57 The following year, the county legislature authorized
the issuance of $21 million in bonds for the purchase of the devel-
opment rights on these parcels at a cost of $5,408 per acre.58 In
1977, the county sold its first bonds and purchased its first devel-
opment rights on 211 acres in the Town of Riverhead. 59
Phase II began in 1978 with the receipt of bids for 249 proper-
ties totaling 11,356 acres which would have required $68 million
to acquire. 60 Since $9 million of the original $21 million had not
been committed by the end of 1979, the county executive recom-
mended the money be spent and an additional $10 million be au-
thorized for Phase 11.61 This additional commitment would bring
51. See SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., CODE § 8-3.
52. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 13.
53. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 13.
54. See Suffolk County, N.Y. Leg. Res. 573-1974, (1974) (adopting Local Law 19-
1974 Relating to the Acquisition of Development Rights in Agricultural Lands); see
also SUFFOLK COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION, supra note 27 (1990).
55. See Memorandum from Roy Fedelem, Principal Planner, Suffolk County Plan-
ning Department [hereinafter Suffolk County Memorandum] (on file with author); see
also SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27.
56. The phases refer to periods when new applications were accepted and new
funds were allocated. While the county usually did not target properties, it did allo-
cate monies to purchase in-fill farm parcels after early phases failed to protect contig-
uous parcels. See Daniels, supra note 34. The problem with fragmented farmland is
discussed later in Part IV(A).
57. See Suffolk County Memorandum, supra note 55; see also SUFFOLK PROGRAM
HISTORY, supra note 27, at 9.
58. See Suffolk County Memorandum, supra note 55; see also SUFFOLK PROGRAM
HISTORY, supra note 27, at 9.
59. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 9. Nathaniel Talmage sold
development rights to 131 acres for $2,725 per acre and George Reeve sold rights to 80
acres for $3,262 per acre. See Suffolk County Memorandum, supra note 55.
60. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 9.
61. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 9.
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the total to $31 million, less than the $55 million originally envi-
sioned at the outset of the program.62 Responding to a call for
assistance from the county executive, Southampton, East Hamp-
ton, and Southold established their own PDR programs using the
same criteria as the county to prioritize their purchases. 63
In 1988, Phase III was recommended and the county legisla-
ture authorized $5 million in 1989, and $5 million in 1990.64 In
1989, development rights on the first twenty-two acres in Phase
III were acquired.65 By 1990, Suffolk County had spent upwards
of $20 million to acquire 4,965.5 acres of development rights in
eight towns, with municipal PDR programs adding another 1,084
acres. 66 In 1996, these numbers had risen to $46 million to buy
development rights to 6,941 acres on 154 farms by 1996.67 The
Peconic Land Trust 68 had also protected more than 2,500 acres of
Long Island farmland by 1995 through donations of land and con-
servation easements. 69
In 1998, the Suffolk County Legislature sought to expand the
farmland protection program by passing Resolution 559-1998, "ad-
ding Article XII-A to the Suffolk County Charter to Provide a Suf-
folk County Community Greenways County Fund."70 After a vote
in which about 65% approved of the Fund,71 the legislature au-
thorized the issuance of $62 million in serial bonds to ensure the
protection of "unique environmental resources."72 Twenty million
dollars of the Fund was authorized for the acquisition of farmland
development rights.7 3 The appropriation and expenditure of these
moneys was made contingent on the receipt of matching funds
from the State, town or federal government of at least thirty per-
cent of the actual cost of acquisition. 74
62. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 9.
63. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 9.
64. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 9.
65. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 9.
66. See Suffolk County Memorandum, supra note 55.
67. See Suffolk County Memorandum, supra note 55.
68. There are over 1,100 local land trusts nationwide, which provide needed fund-
ing, lobbying, and grassroots support for preservation efforts. See Poe et al., supra
note 14.
69. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 15.
70. Suffolk County, N.Y. Leg. Res. 559-1998(1) (introduced Feb. 10, 1998).
71. See Local and National Interest in Farmland Preservation, Memorandum
from William Sanok, Program Director at the Cornell Cooperative Extension (Dec.
1998) [hereinafter Sanok Memorandum].
72. Suffolk County, N.Y. Leg. Res. 559-1998(1).
73. See id. 559-1998(3).
74. See id. 559-1998(3)(a).
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C. Participation of the East End Towns75
With only $35 million allocated by Congress, in the 1996
Farm Bill, to support state and local farmland protection pro-
grams across the country, municipal participation became a criti-
cal element in the effectiveness of Suffolk County's PDR program.
By 1998, all five East End towns had established their own farm-
land preservation programs and created Community Preservation
Funds to support them, using revenue from a two percent tax on
all real estate transfers.76 The New York State Assembly, in
1998, authorized the transfer tax with the passage of bill A9692,
amending "the town law by adding a new section 64-e to provide
for the establishment of Peconic Bay Community Preservation
Funds."77 Bill A9692 also amended the tax law to authorize the
East End towns to impose a real estate transfer tax to raise reve-
nues for the Funds.78
Although the drafters of the bill recognized that using a tax to
raise revenue contradicted "the stated purpose of this legislature
to reduce the state and local tax burden,"79 other considerations
militated in favor of authorizing another tax. First, the Legisla-
ture noted that the preservation of "community character,"80 in-
cluding open space and "significant natural areas,"8 ' was a "public
purpose."8 2 Second, the Legislature had already enacted the Envi-
ronmental Protection Fund and the State Clean Air/Clean Water
Bond Act to provide a dedicated source of funding to effectuate
these public purposes.8 3 The drafters also noted that there was
already an "unprecedented commitment of local funds" by Peconic
Bay governments, who had spent over $50 million since 1980 to
protect community character.8 4 Third, the Peconic Bay region is
seeing "open space and farmland converted to other land uses at
75. The term "East End towns" refers to Southampton, East Hampton, Southold,
Riverhead, and Shelter Island.
76. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 14. Governor Pataki vetoed a transfer
tax bill in 1997, which sought to establish a Community Preservation Fund for the
town of East Hampton. Previous attempts, over the prior twelve years, had failed to
get the issue on the ballot. See Liz Egbert, Pataki Vetoes Transfer Tax, INDEP. ON-
LINE, Sept. 10, 1998, at 14, at http://www.indyeastend.com/news/09109804.htm.
77. Assemb. B. 9692-A, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1998).
78. Id. § 1.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Assemb. B. 9692-A, Reg. Sess. § 1.
83. See id.
84. Id.
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an alarming rate" because of "extreme development pressure"
which threatens the significant financial investment in preserva-
tion.8 5 Finally, the Legislature recognized that "existing tradi-
tional funding mechanisms.., will not provide adequate funding
to preserve fundamental community character in the Peconic
Bay."8 6
The residents of each East End town agreed and voted in
favor of creating the Community Preservation Funds in a
mandatory referendum.8 7 The procedures in each town are sub-
stantially similar, though far more detailed than the county code
provisions. Riverhead, for example, codified the "Community
Preservation Fund Law" in Chapter 44 of its Town Code, entitled
Agricultural Lands Preservation, which details regulations and
procedures for the acquisition of development rights and the regu-
lations governing the imposition of the transfer tax and the crea-
tion of the Fund.88 Riverhead's Code establishes an Advisory
Board "to review and make recommendations on proposed acquisi-
tions of interests in real property using monies from the fund."8 9
The Code further specifies the procedures and requirements for
the acquisition, 90 management, 91 and alienation 92 of the acquired
fee or interest. Finally, section fourteen details the regulations
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Sanok Memorandum, supra note 71.
88. RIVERHEAD, N.Y., CODE § 44-5 (1999).
89. Id. § 14-6.
90. See id. § 14-7. Before any "interest or right in real property shall be acquired,"
a "public hearing [must be] held as required by § 247 of the New York General Munic-
ipal Law." Id. Prior to the public hearing, however, the Town Board may enter into a
"conditional purchasing agreement." Id. Finally, the Town Board, in any resolution
approving an acquisition, must find that the acquisition was the "best alternative for
the protection of community character of all reasonable alternatives available to the
town." Id.
91. See RIVERHEAD, N.Y., CODE § 14-8. This provision establishes management
requirements, like natural and historic preservation, and allows the town to contract
with a not-for-profit land trust, which will "provide for the management and supervi-
sion of lands acquired by the fund." Id. § 14-8(B).
92. See id. § 14-9. The rights or interests, which are acquired by the fund, may be
alienated only for the "purposes permitted by this chapter" and only with "the express
authority of an act of the State Legislature." Id. Moreover, if the Legislature does
allow the alienation, it is "required to provide for the substitution of other lands hav-
ing equal environmental and fair market value and reasonably equivalent usefulness
and location to those to be discontinued." Id. § 14-9(A).
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governing the imposition,9 3 payment,9 4 liability,95 and exemp-
tions96 of the real estate transfer tax.
IV. Evaluation of Suffolk County's Farmland Protection
Program
Suffolk County has relied on the purchase of development
rights as the primary method of farmland preservation. 97 To date,
Suffolk County's Farmland Preservation Program has succeeded
in purchasing the development rights of over 9,000 acres of farm-
land.98 Despite these efforts, Suffolk County continues to lose
farmland for a variety of interdependent reasons, including devel-
opment pressure, high land values, and limited funding.99 The
number of farm acres in Suffolk County has decreased from
123,000 in 1950, to approximately 31,000 today.'0 0 As a result,
the Suffolk County Farmland Protection Plan has had to reduce
its initial farmland preservation goal from 35,000 to 20,000
acres.' 0 Tellingly, the Plan predicts that "at their present rate
there will be only 10,000 acres [of farmland] left in Suffolk in
2012."102
93. See RIVERHEAD, N.Y., CODE § 14-12. The two percent tax shall be imposed on
all conveyances of real property or lesser interest over $500, and shall be deposited
into the Fund.
94. See id. § 14-13.
95. See id. § 14-14. While the grantee must pay the tax, the grantor becomes
jointly and severally liable should grantee be exempt or fail to pay. This provision
also creates a presumption that all conveyances are taxable.
96. See RIVERHEAD, N.Y. CODE § 14-16. Exemptions from the transfer tax include
the following: (1) conveyances to government agencies, (2) conveyances where the en-
tire parcel is subject to certain development restrictions, and (3) conveyances to any
not-for-profit corporation for conservation, environmental, or historic preservation
purposes. See id. In addition, an exemption is allowed of $150,000 on unimproved
property and $75,000 on improved property. This latter exemption is intended to
avoid increasing the price of otherwise affordable housing and real estate.
97. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 14. Other preservation
methods used by Suffolk County include transfer of development rights, cluster and
agricultural zoning, and outright purchases.
98. Telephone Interview with Roy Fedelem, Principal Planner, Suffolk County
Department of Planning (Sept. 8, 1999).
99. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., N.Y. Agric. Statistics Serv., 1997 Census of Agricul-
ture County Profile, Suffolk, N.Y., http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/census97/profiles/
ny/nyp052.pdf (last modified Jan. 28, 1999); see also KEVIN McDONALD & STUART
LOWRIE, PRESERVING THE EAST END: THE CASE FOR THE EAST END COMMUNITY PRESER-
VATION FUND (1998).
100. See SUFFOLK PROTECTION PLAN, supra note 17.
101. See McDONALD & LOWRIE, supra note 99, at 4.
102. McDONALD & LOwRIE, supra note 99, at 4.
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Despite the crisis rhetoric demanding more land preservation,
a successful program will accomplish more than the protection of
acreage. Beyond a farm's physical and environmental impacts,
working agricultural land has broad and multifaceted effects on
the economic, social, and cultural landscape of a community. 10 3 A
farm, therefore, is more than undeveloped land; rather, it is a
functional landscape that often serves to anchor many other activ-
ities and community characteristics that residents value. The in-
terplay of farming and other values is indicated by the fact that
protecting working farms near urban areas can effectively channel
development while increasing the profitability of the farms by pro-
viding a market for their goods. 10 4 A worthwhile farmland preser-
vation program recognizes this fact, and, in turn, encourages
ongoing farming operations.' 0 5 The following analysis of Suffolk
County's PDR program will address this issue of farm viability as
well as other aspects of PDR programs.
A. Viability - Do the Protected Farms Work?
Although agricultural land has significant value as open
space, the ultimate purpose of farmland preservation is defeated if
the farm cannot sustain itself once it is protected. Because a PDR
program is exclusively interested in protecting the land from more
intense future development, however, purchasing development
rights must be considered merely a tool in a larger preservation
program. Notably, of the 7,000 acres Suffolk County had pro-
tected before 1998, 6,900 acres were being farmed, according to
Suffolk's Planning Director. 0 6 This high percentage is likely due
to an effective combination of state and local incentive and protec-
tion measures. 0 7
PDR programs, however might unintentionally contribute to
a decline in agricultural viability by promoting what some have
termed the "impermanence syndrome." 08 Because PDR programs
are limited in the amount of land they can preserve, due to the
cost and the landowner's willingness to sell, they risk creating
farmland that is fragmented and, therefore, not economically via-
103. See discussion infra Part II. A-B.
104. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 16.
105. See generally Rodegerdts, supra note 23; see also White, supra note 10.
106. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 16.
107. See Poe et al., supra note 14; see also SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note
27.
108. Daniels, supra note 34, at 423; see generally Szlanfuct, supra note 24.
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ble.' 0 9 With a "less-than-critical mass" amount of farmland, farm-
ers sense that development is inevitable, especially as complaints
and nuisance suits from surrounding residential developments in-
crease. 110 Farmers, therefore, refrain from long-term investment
in new farm equipment, and overall agricultural productivity of
the area lags.1 '
Proponents of the Community Preservation Funds also
clearly recognized the interplay of these forces in their campaign
for voter approval on the Funds. The Group for the South Fork
and the Nature Conservancy, for instance, lobbied with a warning
that "[i]f we lose more land to development, we'll have a continu-
ous suburban landscape with rural pockets - nothing more than
museum pieces of farms and open space. We want to protect as
much as possible of what remains to avoid the catastrophic effects
of fragmenting our rural landscape." 1 2
Unfortunately, because of the cost of development rights and
the voluntary nature of the PDR program, Suffolk has not been
entirely successful in avoiding the fragmentation that leads to the
impermanence syndrome. One observer noted that because "only
one-quarter of the PDR applicants accepted offers in the second
phase of the [program], . . .the land under protection was scat-
tered and not in contiguous blocks."1' 3 Because this pattern of
protection could lead to "farmland being surrounded by incompati-
ble nonfarm uses over time," Suffolk appropriated $10 million to
purchase the development rights on "in-fill parcels to create blocks
of preserved land."1" 4
Right to farm laws serve to combat the impermanence syn-
drome by protecting farmers when conflicts arise with other land
uses, usually in the form of nuisance suits." 5 The Town of
Riverhead, for example, passed a law that explicitly lists protected
farm practices that are presumed reasonable, including spraying,
raising livestock, constructing barns, and pumping water.1 6
Riverhead's ordinance also requires that, during the approval pro-
cess, the Town Board and Planning Board shall give notice that a
109. See Farming on the Fringe, supra note 1, at 12; see also Daniels, supra note
34, at 423.
110. Farming on the Fringe, supra note 1, at 12.
111. See Farming on the Fringe, supra note 1, at 12.
112. McDONALD & LOWRIE, supra note 99, at 5.
113. Daniels, supra note 34, at 424.
114. Daniels, supra note 34, at 424.
115. See Poe et al., supra note 14.
116. See RIVERHEAD, N.Y., CODE § 44-4.
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proposed development is in proximity to an area encumbered by
an agricultural easement or is within an agricultural district. 117
Some State legislators have recently proposed bills offering a
variety of financial incentives to enhance the ability of a farmer to
operate viable farms. State Senator LaValle, for instance, spon-
sored a bill that encourages farmland preservation through tax in-
centives for landowners of farmland near metropolitan and
suburban areas. 118 Specifically, the bill assesses farmland and
open space at its use value rather than at its full value, thereby
reducing the owner's burden in maintaining the land as a farm or
open space and, consequently, the incentive on the owner to
sell. 1 9 Senator Kuhl also sponsored a bill to amend the Agricul-
ture & Markets Law to direct the Commissioner to create a farm-
land viability program, including matching grants to improve the
profitability and efficiency of farms. 120 Finally, Senator Hoffman
sponsored the "First Farm Financing Act" that will help keep
farmland in agriculture by establishing a revolving loan fund to
assist first-time buyers of farms.' 2 '
B. Permanence
Permanence is widely considered the greatest strength of a
PDR program. This permanence stands in marked contrast to the
permanent loss of the farmland once developed. The purchase of
development rights was chosen by Suffolk County as "the primary
method of farm preservation since it creates a restriction that
runs with the land," 22 and, therefore, is binding on future owners
for an agreed upon time period. 123 The language of section 247 of
the New York General Municipal Law states clearly that the de-
velopment rights, once purchased, may never be used by the land-
owner or her successors. Accordingly, "any interest acquired.., is
hereby enforceable by and against the original parties and the
successors in interest, heirs and assigns of the original parties,"
117. See id.
118. See S. Res. 1632, 1999 Leg., 222d Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
119. See id.
120. See S. Res. 3089B, 1999 Leg., 222d Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
121. See S. Res. 5053, 1999 Leg., 222d Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
122. SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 14.
123. See Am. Farmland Trust - Farmland Info. Ctr., Agricultural Conservation
Easements: Fact Sheet, http://www.farmlandinfo.org/fic/tas/tafs-ace.html (last modi-
fied Sept. 1998) (noting that the holder of the easement is charged with the duty of
enforcing the easement or development restriction).
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provided the acquisition is properly recorded. 124 Furthermore,
"[s]uch enforceability shall not be defeated because of any subse-
quent adverse possession, laches, estoppel, waiver, change in
character of the surrounding neighborhood or any rule of common
law."'25
In keeping with this strict rule, the Suffolk's PDR program
does not provide a procedure through which the farmer may re-
serve the right to buy back the development rights. 126 This is the
case even though "State enabling laws often contain release
clauses" under which an owner can petition to buy back the land
after a number of years and after a showing that the "land is no
longer economically viable."127
As a permanent restriction, PDR also avoids the pitfalls of
other preservation mechanisms. Relying on rezoning, for in-
stance, places the protection of important resources at the whim of
political uncertainty and may even be counter-productive. 128
"Upzoning to larger lot sizes," for instance, "has been damaging to
farm preservation because it is based on a suburban sprawl model
of single family detached homes and requires more land, more
roads, more uniform development. It has also promoted sterile,
cookie-cutter development and discouraged rural, farm-based
commercial and industrial development."' 29 Consequently, devel-
opment pressure on farms has increased, which triggers concerns
about the viability of farming and the effects of the impermanence
syndrome discussed above.' 30
In its overall preservation regime, the Suffolk County Plan-
ning Commission recognizes agricultural districts as merely a
"temporary holding pattern for farmland preservation."' 3 ' Agri-
cultural districts provide farmers with a renewable eight year tax
deduction period, thereby allowing the farmer to continue farm-
124. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 247(4). The enforcement of an acquisition can be
defeated only by a general state law that "expressly states the intent to defeat the
enforcement of any acquisition" pursuant to section 247. Id.
125. Id.
126. See SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., CODE ch. 8.
127. Williams & Bills, supra note 32, at 3.
128. See White, supra note 10 (discussing some problems with exclusive reliance
on agricultural zoning in Part II); see also FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 20 (not-
ing that 50/50 zoning was ineffective in preserving farms). But see Farming on the
Fringe, supra note 1, at 11 (discussing where and why zoning has worked to preserve
farmland).
129. SUFFOLK PROTECTION PLAN, supra note 17.
130. See discussion infra Part III. A.
131. SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 16.
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ing, while giving the county an additional number of years to
purchase a wider variety of agricultural lands as funds become
available. 132 The program, however, is voluntary, and in a rising
real estate market like Suffolk County, participants are unlikely
to stay in the program when selling their land can be very advan-
tageous.133 Without the guarantee of permanence offered by PDR,
preservation efforts may fail to be effective planning tools to chan-
nel and buffer the growth of an expanding urban area. 34
C. Equity
A variety of features make PDR programs generally fair and
equitable. First, a PDR program compensates the owner for the
lost development opportunities, something a zoning restriction
does not.135 The farmer, therefore, is able to reinvest the money
back into farming, thereby helping maintain a profitable opera-
tion, keeping the money in the local economy and the property on
the tax rolls, and preserving the retirement nest egg that farmers
might rely on.136 Second, the owner's participation is voluntary
and he retains all other rights of ownership. 137 The most convinc-
ing testament to the fairness of the PDR program to the land-
owner has been its popularity with farmers, as evidenced by the
long waiting lists of owners offering their development rights for
sale.
Some PDR agreements may be flexible enough to be tailored
to meet the needs of the owner. 138 For example, to provide for ad-
ditional housing, an easement may permit the construction of new
farm buildings and the termination of the easement if surround-
ing conditions make the continuation of farming operations impos-
sible. 139 Suffolk's program, however, does not allow residences to
be constructed on any land in the program, since that would be
132. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 16.
133. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 16.
134. See Farming on the Fringe, supra note 1, at 12.
135. See Daniels, supra note 34, at 424.
136. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 12.
137. See Am. Farmland Trust - Farmland Info. Ctr., Agricultural Conservation
Easements: Fact Sheet, http://www.farmlandinfo.org/fic/tas/tafs-ace.html (last modi-
fied Sept. 1998).
138. See id.
139. See AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, FACT SHEET: NEW YORK ASSISTANCE PAY-
MENTS FOR PURCHASE OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS (1999); see also SUFFOLK PROGRAM
HISTORY, supra note 27, at 18. Suffolk's policy allows for the construction of farm
related buildings but not residences or subdivisions which would be "clearly contrary
to the preservation of open land."
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contrary to the purposes of preservation. 140 Consequently, owners
are encouraged to exclude any dwelling units or carve out a lot for
housing before selling the rights. 141
Some critics do challenge the equity of PDR programs. One
argument maintains that the development value of farmland is a
function of the public infrastructure that makes development pos-
sible. 142 Thus, buying development rights to land with these in-
frastructure services is essentially paying twice with taxpayer
money - "once to create the added value in the land and again to
buy it out."' 43 This unfairness is compounded by the fact that the
purchase price may be paid to speculators. 44 Even early on in
Suffolk County's program, "over two thousand acres were pur-
chased from speculators who were not farmers."1 45
The equity of the particular fundraising approach chosen by
Suffolk County, namely the two percent transfer tax, has also
been questioned. 146 The primary concerns are that the entire bur-
den falls on the buyers of homes rather than the residents, which
may be unfair and may chill the real estate market. 147 Propo-
nents of the tax have defended the tax by arguing that people buy
in a particular community because it has amenities like open
space and a rural character. Therefore, if they want to protect
those amenities, they should be willing to pay a small premium for
their property. Moreover, proponents argue that the tax is fair
because it has been structured to include exemptions for those
seeking to buy affordable housing or land. 48
140. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 18.
141. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 18.
142. See Farming on the Fringe, supra note 1, at 12.
143. Farming on the Fringe, supra note 1, at 12.
144. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 4; see also Farming on the
Fringe, supra note 1, at 12 (citing a 1979 Rutgers study finding only 44% of farmland
in New Jersey was actually owned by farmers).
145. Daniels, supra note 34, at 424 (citing Frances Cerra, Suffolk Plan to Save
Farms is Still at Issue After Four Years, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1980, at B8).
146. Residents of Katonah raised this issue in a public meeting with Kevin Mac-
Donald, Vice President of the Group for the South Fork, during which they considered
the pros and cons of a PDR program in their community. Public hearing with Kevin
MacDonald, Vice-President of the Group for the South Fork, in Town of Katonah
Community Center, Oct. 21, 1999.
147. See Stephen J. Kotz, 'Outsiders' Take Aim at Land Bank Proposal, THE EAST
HAMPTON STAR, Oct. 8, 1998, available at http://archive.easthamptonstar.com/eh-
query/981008/newsl.htm.
148. See Assemb. B. 9692-A, Reg. Sess. § 1449-EE(3).
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D. Cost
The most significant problem with a PDR program remains
its expense. Purchasing development rights is certainly less ex-
pensive than acquiring fee simple and allows the buyer to avoid
the cost of maintaining the land. Where the price of land is high,
however, as in Suffolk County, PDR programs may have limited
effectiveness. At one point, the Suffolk County program had spent
$33.8 million to acquire 108 easements totaling 6,470 acres. 149
Even at that level of spending, Suffolk County could not purchase
the development rights on hundreds of acres that were offered for
sale. For example, the second phase of Suffolk's PDR program,
which began in July 1978, received bids for 249 properties totaling
11,356 acres, for which $68 million was needed to acquire. 150 The
Town of Southampton wanted to spend $2,038,000 for the develop-
ment rights on fifty-four acres on three farms. 151 The Town of
Riverhead spent $4,800,000 for the development rights to 217
acres on five farms.1 52 Finally, the Town of Southold was ready to
spend $1,860,000 on 178.5 acres on six farms. 153 Although the
cost of these purchases is shared between the state and the munic-
ipality, the local costs in these instances range from $465,000
(Southold) to $1.2 million (Riverhead), with Suffolk County pre-
pared to spend $4 million.' 54
Unfortunately, the nature of a PDR program may itself bol-
ster the high price of the land it seeks to preserve. According to
one commentator, "land acquisition programs may even suffer a
fatal paradox of diminishing returns."155 Simply stated, as more
land is placed out of reach of developers, the value and the devel-
opment pressure on the remaining land to those developers in-
creases. The high cost of land is further exacerbated by
speculative buying of land for development. 56 The result is that
money buys less land. Evidence of this theory may be the huge
sums of money that some estimate are required to achieve the
149. See Am. Farmland Trust - Farmland Info. Ctr., Status of Selected Local PACE
Programs: Fact Sheets, http://www.farmlandinfo.org/fic/tas/tafs-paceloc.pdf (Mar.
2000).
150. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 9.
151. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 9.
152. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 9.
153. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 9.
154. See SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 9.
155. Kevin Kasowski, Rural America at a Crossroads, DEVELOPMENTS, July 1993,
at 4.
156. See Daniels, supra note 34.
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farmland preservation goals. According to the Group for the
South Fork and the Nature Conservancy, $230 million will be re-
quired to achieve their preservation goals. 157
E. Erosion of Local Authority
Notably, PDR programs may unintentionally cause long-term
adverse consequences to the ability of local governments to effi-
ciently regulate the land use activities in their communities. The
option of buying out the owner's rights to the land in order to pro-
tect an important resource is often the simplest method of achiev-
ing the necessary control over the parcel. As an essentially two
party transaction, however, the purchase of development rights
transaction is more private than public in nature.158 As a result,
acquisitions lack the political accountability that inheres in the
"fundamentally public" zoning process, which "affords the oppor-
tunity for public debate and dialogue." 159 The "buy out" option is
chosen to avoid a takings issue, even though "the legislative exer-
cise of zoning authority finds sufficient foothold to withstand tak-
ings challenges with some degree of certainty." 60 The argument
continues that, although the purchase of development rights is po-
litically expedient, it is neither fiscally conservative nor appropri-
ate for a local government to buy the resources it seeks to protect
when it can achieve the same level of protection through the exer-
cise of existing authority.' 6 ' When a local government purchases
property to limit its use to its current use rather than exert its
land use authority, that action "reinforces erroneous expectations
on the part of many members of the public that their property
rights are inviolate." 162 This in turn fuels a false view of the need
157. See McDONALD & LowRIE, supra note 99, at 6. This report states the preser-
vation goals as follows: 80% of farmland at risk in Riverhead and Southold, 90% in
Southampton and East Hampton, and 75% on Shelter Island. See McDONALD & Low-
RIE, supra note 99, at 5; See also FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 15. By acquiring
donations and conservation easements to more than 2,500 acres, the Peconic Land
Trust not only helped preserve significantly more land than would otherwise be pro-
tected, but kept the public from spending close to $40 million to purchase the land.
158. See John M. Vandlik, Waiting for Uncle Sam to Buy the Farm.. .Forest, or
Wetland? A Call for New Emphasis on State and Local Land Use Controls in Natural
Resource Protection, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 691 (1997).
159. Vandlik, supra note 158, at 703.
160. Vandlik, supra note 158, at 704.
161. See Vandlik, supra note 158, at 711; See eg., SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY,
supra note 27, at 16 (establishing agricultural districts is a zoning mechanism that
Suffolk County has used to protect farmland - as of 1990, almost 12,000 acres were in
agricultural districts).
162. Vandlik, supra note 158, at 712.
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for government compensation for diminution in value irrespective
of whether there is an actual taking and, ultimately, makes it po-
litically more difficult for local governments to enact zoning
restrictions. 163
Although the "possibility of a challenge to agricultural zoning
under the taking doctrine is very real,"164 there is little evidence of
such challenges in Suffolk County. This may be because of Suf-
folk's relatively limited use of zoning to protect farmland. Be-
cause of the limited effectiveness of agricultural districting,
Suffolk County has relied on it merely to support its PDR pro-
gram. By providing the farmer with an eight year tax reduction,
agriculture districts act as a "temporary holding pattern for farm
preservation." 65 This is "useful to the Suffolk County [PDR] Pro-
gram since it allows farmers to continue farming for an additional
number of years and gives Suffolk County the opportunity to
purchase a wider variety of agricultural lands as new funds be-
come available." 166
F. Political Controversy
Finally, the ability of Suffolk County and the East End towns
to respond to the farmland crisis suffered somewhat from its
choice of a two percent transfer tax as the funding mechanism for
acquiring development rights. Local news stories reveal the level
of real and political capital that was expended in order to pass the
referendum in favor of the transfer tax. 67 In 1997, despite strong
local support and the adoption of a transfer tax by the East Hamp-
ton Town Board, Governor Pataki vetoed a bill that proposed to
create the East Hampton Community Preservation Fund, with
money from a two percent transfer tax on all real estate purchases
in East Hampton.' 68 While Pataki noted that the bill failed to in-
163. See Vandlik, supra note 158, at 712.
164. Daniels, supra note 34, at 425 (citing U. DEL. AGRIC. EXPERIMENT STATION,
PURCHASE OF DEv. RIGHTS PROGRAMS IN THE NORTHEAST (John Mackenzie, ed. 1988)).
165. SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 16.
166. SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 16.
167. Both opponents, primarily the realtor associations, and proponents of the tax
spent approximately $250,000 campaigning on the issue in the period before the refer-
endum. Telephone Interview with Kevin MacDonald, Vice President of The Group for
the South Fork, (Sept. 23, 1999); see also Stephen J. Kotz, 'Outsiders' Take Aim at
Land Bank Proposal, THE EAST HAMPTON STAR, Oct. 8, 1998, available at http://
archive.easthamptonstar.com/ehquery/981008/newsl.htm.
168. See Carissa Katz, Pataki Strikes Down Local Land Tax Vote, THE EAST HAMP-
TON STAR, Sept. 11, 1997, available at http://archive.easthamptonstar.com/ehquery/
970911/real2.htm.
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clude other East End towns and to exempt farmer-to-farmer
transfers and sales, others highlighted the strong lobbying done
by the State Board of Realtors who feared the chilling effect of
adding a premium to the price of a home. 169 After more than a
decade of lobbying, failed attempts to get a transfer tax bill on the
ballot, and executive vetoes, Pataki signed the East End Land
Bank Bill in 1998.170 Later that year, voters in all five East End
towns supported the transfer tax at the polls.171 Popular support
came despite what was characterized as a "despicable" $250,000
ad campaign against the proposal funded by state and national
realtor associations. 172
IV. Conclusion
The purchase of development rights provides a legally sound,
permanent way to preserve farmland. An evaluation of Suffolk
County's farmland preservation efforts, however, reveals that the
effectiveness of a PDR program is limited, and is most successful
when undertaken as part of a larger farmland protection effort.
Although purchasing the development rights on agricultural land
promises the preservation of the land in perpetuity, this approach
is severely limited by the expense of acquiring these rights. As
the Suffolk County plan suggests, "[e]ven with all of the funds au-
thorized, it is still necessary to use [other] methods of preserva-
tion."1 73 Less affluent communities, therefore, may find a PDR
program out of reach. Purchasing permanent protection to pre-
serve the character of a community from the threat of sprawl de-
velopment, however, may be worth the cost.
169. See Carissa Katz, Transfer Tax on Hold, THE EAST HAMPTON STAR, Sept. 4,
1997, available at http://archive.easthamptonstar.com/ehquery/970904/news3.htm;
see also Carissa Katz, Pataki Strikes Down Local Land Tax Vote, THE EAST HAMPTON
STAR, Sept. 11, 1997, available at http://archive.easthamptonstar.com/ehquery/
970911/rea12.htm. The State Farm Bureau also opposed the bill at the last minute
because the farmer-to-farmer exemption was removed from the original bill. Id.
170. See Carissa Katz, Land Bill is Signed; Now It's Up to Voters, THE EAST HAMP-
TON STAR, June 25, 1998, available at http://archive.easthamptonstar.com/ehquery/
980625/newsl.htm.
171. See Carissa Katz, Transfer Tax Approved, THE EAST HAMPTON STAR, Nov. 5,
1998, available at http:/archive.easthamptonstar.com/ehquery/981105/news2.htm.
The percentage of favorable votes were as follows: East Hampton 66.4; Southampton
just under 60; Shelter Island almost 72; Southold 59; and Riverhead 58. Id.
172. Stephen J. Kotz, 'Outsiders' Take Aim at Land Bank Proposal, THE EAST
HAMPTON STAR, Oct. 8, 1998, available at http:/archive.easthamptonstar.com/eh-
query/981008/newsl.htm.
173. SUFFOLK PROGRAM HISTORY, supra note 27, at 19.
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